In recent years, European institutions have documented a steady increase in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) targeting the European Union and its Member States. In official EU reports, the Russian Federation is identified as the most active and persistent actor, within a broader ecosystem that also includes proxy networks, intermediaries and opportunistic alignments with other state actors.

The primary objective is not direct voter persuasion, but the erosion of trust, the polarisation of public debate and the weakening of European cohesion over the medium to long term.

EUvsDisinfo and systemic monitoring
Since 2015, the EEAS — through the East StratCom Task Force — has operated EUvsDisinfo, a public database of documented disinformation cases. Its value lies less in individual examples than in identifying recurring patterns and narratives over time.

FIMI reports, scale and convergence
EEAS FIMI reports document hundreds of incidents and highlight growing narrative convergence between authoritarian information ecosystems, particularly those linked to Russia and China.

Large-scale coordinated operations
Public investigations have described operations such as Doppelgänger and multilingual pseudo-media networks connected to the “Pravda / Portal Kombat” ecosystem, capable of replicating content across multiple countries and languages.

Sources
EEAS – Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/fimi_en
Council of the European Union – Protecting the EU from foreign interference
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/foreign-information-manipulation/
EUvsDisinfo – Database
https://euvsdisinfo.eu
EDMO – Publications
https://edmo.eu/publications/
Meta – Security / Threat Reports
https://about.fb.com/news/category/security/
AI Forensics
https://www.aiforensics.org
Viginum
https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/viginum
Atlantic Council – DFRLab
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/digital-forensic-research-lab/

Italy is widely described as a structurally vulnerable target of Russian information operations. Italian intelligence reports to Parliament consistently describe multi-vector campaigns aimed at undermining trust in institutions, weakening European cohesion and exploiting existing political and social fractures.

A distinctive feature of the Italian context is the convergence between pro-Kremlin narratives and anti-system ecosystems, including conspiracy-oriented communities and protest movements, which tend to realign rapidly around new crises.

Sources
Italian Intelligence Reports (DIS)
https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it
EUvsDisinfo – Italy overview
https://euvsdisinfo.eu

Germany is considered one of the primary targets of pro-Kremlin disinformation in Europe due to its political and economic weight and its central role in supporting Ukraine. German authorities treat information manipulation as a threat to democratic security, not merely as a media issue.

According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), campaigns seek to delegitimise the federal government, polarise public debate and exploit sensitive issues such as energy transition, cost of living and rearmament.

Sources
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
https://www.verfassungsschutz.de
EEAS – FIMI
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/fimi_en

France has adopted one of the most explicit institutional approaches to countering foreign information interference. With the creation of Viginum, disinformation is formally treated as a form of state interference requiring dedicated and continuous monitoring.

French analyses have played a key role in exposing coordinated networks such as the Portal Kombat ecosystem and sharing findings with European partners.

Sources
Viginum
https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/viginum
French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr

Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway are often cited as highly resilient information environments. Nevertheless, Nordic security services report increased disinformation activity, particularly following NATO enlargement and in relation to Baltic security.

A defining feature of the Nordic response is close regional cooperation between intelligence, defence and strategic communication authorities.

Sources
Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)
https://supo.fi
Danish Defence Intelligence Service
https://www.fe-ddis.dk

Spain appears in European monitoring as a consistent target of opportunistic disinformation campaigns linked to polarising issues such as NATO, Ukraine, energy policy and internal territorial tensions.

The primary objective is not persuasion, but the amplification of distrust and social fragmentation.

Sources
EUvsDisinfo
https://euvsdisinfo.eu
EDMO – Publications
https://edmo.eu/publications/
EEAS – FIMI
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/fimi_en