Lysning

United States: Breaking with the Transatlantic Order

From multilateral leadership to transactional logic

Donald Trump's return to the U.S. presidency marks a profound shift in American foreign policy. This is not merely a change in style, but a redefinition of the value placed on alliances, the role of multilateral institutions, and the relationship between military power and economics.

For decades, the United States had built its global influence through a network of stable alliances based on strategic interests and shared values. NATO, in this framework, was not just a military alliance but a political security community. This approach had been reaffirmed under the Biden administration, especially after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Under Trump, this paradigm is being progressively abandoned. Alliances are no longer considered structural commitments but negotiable instruments whose value depends on immediate returns for U.S. interests. The political language itself reflects this transformation: allies are described as economically weak, politically divided, and bearers of values no longer deemed compatible.

Pressure on Allies and Use of Economic Power

This approach translates into a more assertive and unilateral foreign policy. The use of tariffs, trade threats, and direct pressure becomes a standard tool even toward historic partners. The distinction between allies and economic competitors blurs, making transatlantic cooperation more fragile and contingent.

The Greenland case, an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, assumes strong symbolic value. U.S. pressure on an area belonging to a NATO ally demonstrates Washington's willingness to question established territorial arrangements when direct strategic interests are at stake, particularly in the Arctic.

Ukraine as a Bargaining Chip and Shifting Priorities

The paradigm shift emerges with particular clarity in the Ukraine dossier. Support for Kyiv is no longer presented as a consequence of political commitments or shared principles, but as a negotiation object. The 2025 agreement on the reconstruction fund and strategic resources integrates military aid into a logic of economic compensation.

In this framework, Europe is pushed to assume a growing share of the costs of its own security, while competition with China remains Washington's long-term strategic priority. Russia is managed as a secondary dossier, alternating pressure and negotiating availability according to convenience.

An Alliance Formally Intact, Politically Weakened

The United States is not withdrawing from the international order but is unilaterally recomposing its rules. Alliances remain formally in place but lose part of their binding character. For European allies, this marks the end of the certainty that continental security is automatically guaranteed by American political continuity.

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NATO expansion

From the 1999–2004 enlargements to the Nordic accession after 2022

NATO enlargement after the Cold War became a structural point of contention between Russia and the West because it combines legal realities, historical expectations, and security perceptions. Western governments describe enlargement as the outcome of sovereign requests and formal accession procedures, while Russian authorities have consistently framed it as a breach of political assurances given in 1990–1991 and as a progressive military encirclement.

The first major post‑1991 rounds included Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (1999), followed by a larger wave in 2004 that included, among others, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. NATO summit documents describe enlargement as conditional on reforms and unanimous approval, and they are paired with frameworks for relations with Russia, including the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act. In the 2000s, institutional cooperation formats also existed, indicating that relations were not uniformly confrontational.

Russia’s official narrative was articulated sharply in 2007, when Vladimir Putin, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, criticised NATO enlargement as destabilising. After 2014 and especially after 24 February 2022, NATO enlargement has been repeatedly cited in Russian official statements as a core security concern and a key explanatory frame for confrontation.

Ukraine’s case complicates a linear account in which enlargement alone drives escalation. Ukraine was not a NATO member and had no MAP status; it experienced periods of formal non‑alignment, yet it was attacked and had territory annexed. UN General Assembly resolutions have reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

The Nordic enlargement in 2023–2024 reflects a different dynamic: Finland and Sweden ended long-standing neutrality traditions and sought NATO membership after Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine. Both governments describe the decision as a response to a transformed threat environment, while Russian authorities warned of increased risks and militarisation in Northern Europe. Overall, the record shows NATO enlargement as both a formal process and a clash of security perceptions that has intensified markedly since 2014 and 2022.

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Russia: Long War, Isolation, and Authoritarian Convergence

Territorial gains and rising costs

Since 2022, Russia has been engaged in the broadest military confrontation with the West since the end of the Cold War. Despite controlling approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory, these conquests have not translated into a definitive political or strategic victory.

Military losses and prolonged mobilization have deeply affected the armed forces and the economy, transformed into a system of permanent mobilization.

Break with Europe and External Dependence

Sanctions and the end of the energy relationship with the European Union have produced a structural break with the continent. Reorientation toward other markets has mitigated the immediate impact but under less favorable conditions and with growing external dependence.

Convergence with Authoritarian Regimes

In response to Western isolation, Russia has intensified cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea. These relationships do not constitute a compact ideological alliance but an opportunistic network based on military, energy, and political exchanges between states under sanctions.

China represents the main partner, but in a highly asymmetric relationship in which Moscow assumes an increasingly subordinate role.

Blocked Diplomacy and Hybrid Warfare

Moscow formally participates in diplomatic initiatives but refuses any agreement that does not recognize territorial conquests as irreversible. In parallel, it intensifies the use of hybrid warfare: cyberattacks, sabotage, and disinformation against Europe.

A More Militarized and Isolated Power

In the medium-long term, Russia appears increasingly militarized, isolated, and dependent, capable of disrupting the European order but with reduced margins of structural influence. The continuation of the conflict thus becomes an internal political necessity as well as a strategic choice.

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